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I. THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE 
The marshalling requirement only applies when a party is "challenging a fact 
finding." Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9). 
Mrs. Wood argues that the Appeals Board failed to apply the correct legal standard 
in determining that the mental stress she was subject to did not meet the extraordinary 
stress requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106. The facts of the case are only 
relevant to a determination of whether the Appeals Board used the proper standard. For 
example, the Appeals Board citation of Mrs. Wood's testimony that all radio sales 
positions involved the same types of stresses she experienced shows that the Appeals 
Board was not applying the broad "national employment and nonemployment life 
standard." Mrs. Wood's use of such facts is not an attempt to challenge a fact found by 
the Appeals Board. 
Even if the marshalling rule does apply in this case the Respondents have not 
pointed to a single piece of evidence supporting the Appeals Board decision on the 
specific issue in this case. Respondents do cite the report of Dr. Mooney but this report is 
a psychological evaluation that addresses issues of medical causation. The Appeals 
Board decision did not address the issue of medical causation and this appeal only 
concerns issues of legal causation. Respondents have failed to identify any evidence 
supporting the Appeals Board determination that the stress of Mrs. Wood's work was not 
extraordinary when compared with national employment and nonemployment life. Thus, 
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even if the marshalling requirement does apply the Respondents have failed to identify 
any evidence that should have been marshaled but was not. 
The Respondents' argument that the issue in this case is a dispute about the findings 
of fact is not an accurate statement about the issue. The issue in this case concerns the 
Appeals Board application of the legal causation standard of Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-
106. Because this issue is an issue of law and not a challenge to a finding of fact, the 
marshalling requirement does not apply. 
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-3-106 URGED BY 
THE RESPONDENTS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 requires that an applicant for workers' compensation 
benefits due to mental stress show that the mental stress the application was subjected to 
was extraordinary when compared with "national employment and nonemployment life." 
Respondents argue that the Appeals Board properly applied this standard in its 
decision. However, neither the Appeals Board nor the Respondents have cited a single 
piece of evidence supporting this claim. Instead the Respondents rely on the Appeals 
Board statement of the law, the law of other jurisdictions, a description of radio sales 
positions. 
First, the Respondents reliance on the Appeals Board statement of law and its 
conclusion is insufficient to show that the Appeals Board applied the correct standard. 
Respt.'s Brief 19 (May 11, 2005). As noted previously, the Appeals Board provided no 
facts to support its decision that specifically address the "national employment and 
nonemployment life" standard. The Appeals Board's unsupported conclusion and 
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statement of the law is not sufficient to show that it correctly applied the law. The 
Appeals Board's failure to provide factual support for its decision alone requires a 
remand of this case. Adams v. Bd. of Rev. of the Indus. Commn., 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
1991) ("An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review.") A bare conclusion 
is simply not sufficient to show that the Appeals Board correctly applied the law. 
Second, the Respondents reliance on the law of other jurisdictions is not 
appropriate. Respt.'s Brief 20 (May 11, 2005). The cases cited by the Respondents 
apply rules that are completely inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 on its 
face. For example, the Iowa case Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty, 526 N.W.2d 
845 (Iowa 1995), provides the Iowa court's reasoning for adopting a rule that compared 
the applicant's mental stress to the stress of similarly situated employees. Likewise, the 
Missouri case Williams v. DePaul Health Center, 996 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
uses a similarly situated employee standard to determine whether the stress was 
extraordinary. On its face, the Utah law clearly requires that the mental stress of the 
applicant's work be compared with "national employment and nonemployment life." 
There is no mention in the statute about similarly situated employees. These cases 
therefore conflict with the Utah law on its face and are, therefore, not applicable here. 
Third, the Respondents cite the Occupational Outlook Handbook 2002-03 for a 
description of advertising employees. Respt.'s Brief 21 (May 11, 2005). This evidence 
was never presented to the Appeals Board and is therefore inappropriately raised here. 
Furthermore, the description of the advertising industry jobs does not address "national 
employment and nonemployment life" as required by the statute. It is a specific 
description about a specific category of jobs. The description includes terms such as 
"emotionally draining" and "stressful." If anything, the description validates Mrs. Woods 
claim that her job is extraordinarily stressful because of the demands and stresses of the 
job as described in the Occupation Outlook Handbook in comparison to other jobs. Thus, 
this description does not address the "national employment and nonemployment life" 
standard as required by the statute. 
The arguments used by Respondents to address the legal causation standard of Utah 
Code Ann. 34A-3-106 conflict with the law on its face. Therefore, these arguments are 
insufficient to support the Appeals Board decision. 
CONCLUSION 
This case addresses the issue of whether the Appeals Board applied the correct 
legal causation standard and thus the marshalling requirement does not apply. 
Furthermore, the Respondents have not produced a single fact or argument showing that 
the Appeals Board applied the correct legal standard in deciding this case. The Appeals 
Board decision is completely devoid of any specific justification for its decision or any 
clear evidence showing that it applied the correct standard. The arguments Respondents 
use directly conflict with the Utah Code Ann. 34A-3-106 on its face. Thus, the Court 
should remand this case with the instruction that the Appeals Board apply the "national 
4 
employment and nonemployment life" test to the facts of this case. 
DATED thisfc^day of June 2005. 
MYLER LAW OFFICE 
Bradford D. Myler 
Attorney's for Petitioner 
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